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Monopolization through acquisition

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  • Prokop, Jacek

Abstract

This paper considers the possibility of monopolizing a three-firm industry through acquisition of rivals in the absence of the restrictions imposed by the antitrust authorities. The analysis is conducted in two models: a static and a dynamic model of monopolization by a single buyer. In contrast to preceding models, a firm owner is allowed to use mixed strategies in order to decide whether to sell his firm or not. The static model implies that the monopolization through acquisition can be profitable. However, the dynamic formulation of the problem suggests that the expected profits are much smaller, and may not be sufficient to cover any fixed costs associated with the acquisition process. Moreover, the probability of selling the firm by its owner is almost zero, which makes the whole monopolization process extremely unlikely.

Suggested Citation

  • Prokop, Jacek, 2005. "Monopolization through acquisition," MPRA Paper 43683, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:43683
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43683/2/MPRA_paper_43683.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-227, March.
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    3. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 205-229, October.
    4. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 465-499.
    6. Harris, Ellie G, 1994. "Why One Firm Is the Target and the Other the Bidder in Single-Bidder, Synergistic Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(2), pages 263-280, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacek Prokop, 2005. "Monopolizacja poprzez wykup przedsiębiorstw," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 9, pages 47-62.
    2. Jacek Prokop, 2009. "Monopolisation of triopoly – revisited," International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(2), pages 113-125.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopolization; acquisitions; antitrust policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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