The sugar-pie game
AbstractPlaying a bargaining game the players are trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. However, HE is not very keen on sweets and does not prefer a piece of the pie if the size of the pie is too small or too large. In HIS view, too small or too large pies are not of a reasonable quality. In contrast, SHE, the second actor, likes sweets what ever they are. HE is a soft negotiator but SHE is a tough negotiator. The paper addresses the problem: what should be HIS power of negotiations if an equal ½-division of the pie is desirable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37901.
Date of creation: 07 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
bargaining power; bargaining game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-04-17 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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