Micro-microcrédit et asymétries d’information : cas du Maroc
[INFORMATION asymmetries and microcredit: The Moroccan case]
AbstractIn this paper we apply the Principal/Agent theory in case of microcredit granted to the Moroccan micro-companies. The practice reveals us that a part of the receipted credits is diverted from its initial objective. Indeed, a situation of information asymmetries linked with adverse selection and moral hazard can be noticed. Given that the Agent behavior (the debtor) is unobservable, the Principal (the Creditor) cannot select every time the good types of Agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20080.
Date of creation: 15 May 2007
Date of revision:
Microfinance; Microcredit Institutions; Moroccan Micro-companies; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Principal/Agent Theory; Information Asymmetries.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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