The dominance of income over commodity taxation for the single consumer case, implies that if the consumer is asked about what tax she would pay to bear a given tax burden, she would choose income taxation. This paper provides a version of this preference for income taxation for the case of several heterogeneous consumers by means of a game where the government allows each consumer to choose between the two tax regimes.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
14291.
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