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Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour

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  • Madden, Gary G
  • Savage, Scott J

Abstract

Recent technology change and market liberalization have substantially reduced the costs of providing international message telephone services (IMTS). However, the full extent of these cost reductions have generally not been reflected in lower prices. This paper reviews the recent literature on international telecommunications markets, and examines regulation and IMTS pricing behaviour. Particular attention is given to the accounting rate system (ARS), uniform settlement policies, and asymmetric competition. Several market behaviour scenarios are described where regulation has resulted in carriers implementing inefficient pricing rules for both accounting and collection rates. Finally, economic and political strategies are put forward that could supplant the current outmoded and uneconomic ARS, and bring about the full benefits of a freely functioning marketplace to telecommunications users.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11121.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Publication status: Published in Industrial and Corporate Change 1.10(2001): pp. 247-265
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11121

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Keywords: Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour;

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  1. Oecd, 1997. "New Technologies and their Impact on the Accounting Rate System," OECD Digital Economy Papers, OECD Publishing 28, OECD Publishing.
  2. Ergas, Henry & Paterson, Paul, 1991. "International telecommunications settlement arrangements : An unsustainable inheritance?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-48, February.
  3. Frieden, Rob, 1993. "International toll revenue division : Tackling the inequities and inefficiencies," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 221-233, April.
  4. Scanlan, Mark, 1998. "Using call-back to demonstrate the discriminatory nature of the proportionate return rule," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(11), pages 913-930, December.
  5. Cheong, Ken & Mullins, Mark, 1991. "International telephone service imbalances : Accounting rates and regulatory policy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 107-118, April.
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