Assimetria de Informação e Incentivos na Formação do Capital Humano-Uma Análise Teórica Sobre o Caso do Programa Bolsa Família

The use of the school frequency as a proxy for determination of the success, of the Programa Bolsa Família, in the elimination of the cycle of the poverty in the regions poor, can promote wrongs results. The best variable, in this case, a unobservable one, is the effort implemented by pupil. Thus, the incentive supplied for the Government, must not only stimulate the school frequency, but, also, the effort, because, the two variables can present a not perfect correlation. Through the modeling of the principal-agent, between the Government and the pupil (representative one) is analyzed the effort choice process. The results shown, the even a perfect correlation between the school frequency and the effort, the incentive, in the current system, generates a minimum effort. It exists, thus, currently, a ?dominate? Nash equilibrium. In the environment, where the correlation between the two variables is imperfect, the maximum depends on influences of the nature, as well as the paid transferences. According to results, the current, incentive system generates the pupil permanence in a low-level equilibrium of human capital. Thus, another system of incentive must be considered by the program, in which the transferences are conditional to some observed variables.