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Are Financing Needs a Constraint to Earnings Management? Evidence for Private Portuguese Firms

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Author Info
José António Moreira () (CETE, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)
Abstract

In this paper I test two intuitions. First, that small private firms have incentives to undertake earnings management. Second, that firms’ financing needs are one of such incentives, constraining the sense of the income manipulation. The tax incentive is deemed to motivate firms into adopting income decreasing actions aimed at reducing the tax bill, and is especially strong in an environment where they are managed by the owners and with close alignment between the accounting and tax systems. However, the debt incentive, which tends to affect mainly those firms with high financing needs, is expected to act as a constraint to the adoption of income decreasing actions, given that firms want to signal their quality to banks. The empirical evidence obtained from a sample of small private Portuguese firms fully supports my intuitions, showing that firms with low financing needs tend to focus on the minimization of the tax bill. Those with high needs are more pervasive in reporting larger profits. Moreover, firms with audited accounts seem to show a lower likelihood of reporting profits, and tentative explanations are either that they are more constrained in adopting earnings management actions, or that audited accounting may act as a signal of their quality, a kind of substitute for the signal underlying the sign and size of reported earnings.

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Paper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series CETE Discussion Papers with number 0610.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:por:cetedp:0610

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Related research
Keywords: earnings management incentives income tax small firms Portugal.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
L29 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Other

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  1. Cindy Durtschi & Peter Easton, 2005. "Earnings Management? The Shapes of the Frequency Distributions of Earnings Metrics Are Not Evidence Ipso Facto," Journal of Accounting Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(4), pages 557-592, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McNichols, Maureen F., 2000. "Research design issues in earnings management studies," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4-5), pages 313-345. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sweeney, Amy Patricia, 1994. "Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 281-308, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. José António Moreira, 2006. "Manipulação para Evitar Perdas: o Impacto do Conservantismo," CETE Discussion Papers 0605, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  5. Degeorge, Francois & Patel, Jayendu & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(1), pages 1-33, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Burgstahler, David & Dichev, Ilia, 1997. "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 99-126, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Aasmund Eilifsen, Kjell Henry Knivsfla, Frode Saettem, 1999. "Earnings manipulation: cost of capital versus tax," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 481-491, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F32-F53, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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