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Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization

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  • M.Utku Unver

Abstract

We analyze mechanisms to kidney exchange with good samaritan donors where exchange is feasible not only among donor-patient pairs but also among such pairs and non-directed alturistic donors. We show that you request my donor-I get your turn mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1999]) is the only mechanism that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, weakly neutral and consistent.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 255.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision: Jan 2006
Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:255

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  1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Consistent House Allocation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 561-574, March.
  2. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2001. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence," Game Theory and Information 0112002, EconWPA, revised 26 Sep 2002.
  3. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun S�nmez, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
  4. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
  5. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
  6. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
  7. Ehlers,Lars & Klaus,Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
  9. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0308002, EconWPA.
  10. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  11. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  12. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  13. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
  14. Chambers, Christopher P., 2004. "Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 953-962, December.
  15. Zenios, Stefanos & Woodle, E. Steve & Ross, Lainie Friedman, 2001. "Primum Non Nocere: Avoiding Harm to Vulnerable Wait List Candidates in an Indirect Kidney Exchange," Research Papers 1684, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  16. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  17. Papai, Szilvia, 2007. "Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 208-235, January.
  18. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
  19. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  20. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
  21. Yan Chen & Tayfun S�nmez, 2002. "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1669-1686, December.
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  23. Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2002. "Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 347-361, February.
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Cited by:
  1. YIlmaz, Özgür, 2009. "Random assignment under weak preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 546-558, May.

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