Elites bancarie durante il fascismo tra economia regolata ed autonomia

The aim of this paper is to analyse the relations between the bankers and the fascist regime and to verify if the regime can be considered as an agent of business elites or these are been submited to the dictatorship. We deal with two problems: the extension of turnover of bankers and managers in all banking sector; the changes in role and function of banking activity during interwar period, from the liberalist economic policy of the first fascism to the corporative organization of the late years. From the evidence that we have shown, we conclude that, in this period, the ruling class of regime and the old liberal (or prefascist) elites converged toward some solutions of common interest, as well as banking crises, financial regulation. The regime refrained from the credit's conquest, and the elites adhered to political purposes of dictatorship, in some case obtorto collo, but safeguarding a some degree of autonomy. All totalitarian control of microdecisions in credit system was an unrealistic target. The variety of forms for corporate control in banking system, regional and local milieux of non profit organizations in credit institutions and a renstreined diffusion of managerial experience protected in some extent the sector from external intrusions. Nevertheless, the basis of a macroeconomic control was built under the fascism as an institutional solution of credit disturbances and financial instability. The corporatist economic policy of regime was an experience far from a "third way" for overcoming capistalist economy without falling into the socialist planism. In credit sector the fascism met the main constraints, also if the banking system was formally under public control.