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Location and Horizontal Differentiation under Duopoly with Marshallian Externalities

Author

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  • Gaetano Alfredo Minerva

Abstract

A classical differentiated duopoly model is cast in a two regions' framework. An entrant firm, which locates in the other region from the incumbent, comes in and competes with the rival, under markets' segmentation. In the first stage of the game, it has to choose product differentiation. The resulting equilibrium is compared under two different settings: competition in prices (Bertrand) and quantities (Cournot). It is shown that, under both modes of competition, the entrant maximizes product differentiation, producing a completely different good. Afterwards, the Cournot model is extended by assuming that, when firms are located together, they benefit from Marshallian localization economies. First, the minimum cost reduction inducing agglomeration is computed. Second, the implications of a linear spillover function (linking product differentiation to marginal cost reduction) against a quadratic specification, with respect to location and product differentiation, are investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaetano Alfredo Minerva, 2003. "Location and Horizontal Differentiation under Duopoly with Marshallian Externalities," Discussion Papers 2003/10, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2003/10
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    File URL: https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2003-10.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2010. "Child policy solutions for the unemployment problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 147-149, December.
    2. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2009. "Longevity, fertility and PAYG pension systems sustainability," Discussion Papers 2009/77, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Marco Guerrazzi, 2005. "Notes on Continuous Dynamic Models: the Benhabib-Farmer Condition for Indeterminacy," Discussion Papers 2005/54, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    4. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2011. "On economic growth and minimum wages," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 59-82, May.
    5. Pompeo Della Posta, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Instruments and Policy Games Reconsidered," Discussion Papers 2003/12, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    6. Lorenzo Corsini & Pier Mario Pacini & Luca Spataro, 2010. "Workers' Choice on Pension Schemes: an Assessment of the Italian TFR Reform Through Theory and Simulations," Discussion Papers 2010/96, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    7. Lorenzo Corsini & Elisabetta Olivieri, 2008. "Technological Change and the Wage Differential between Skilled and Unskilled Workers: Evidence from Italy," Discussion Papers 2008/73, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    8. Luca Gori, 2009. "Endogenous fertility, family policy and multiple equilibria," Discussion Papers 2009/79, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    9. Maurizio Lisciandra, 2007. "The Role of Reciprocating Behaviour in Contract Choice," Discussion Papers 2007/65, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intra-industry trade; product differentiation; location; Marshallian externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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