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Merger stability in a three firm game

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Author Info
Duarte Brito () (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
João Gata () (Autoridade da Concorrência and Universidade de Aveiro and UECE/ISEG-UTL)

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Abstract

We compare different notions of stability in three firm merger games. We discuss some of their shortcomings and introduce an alternative notion of stability which overcomes them. The paper concludes with an illustrative example.

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File URL: http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/WP10_merger_stability_in_a_three_firm_game_(wp).pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Portuguese Competition Authority in its series Working Papers with number 10.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pca:wpaper:10

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Postal: Rua laura Alves, no.4 7o, 1050-138 Lisboa
Phone: (351) 21 790 20 00
Fax: (351) 21 790 20 99
Email:
Web page: http://www.autoridadedaconcorrencia.pt/
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Duarte Brito).

Related research
Keywords: endogenous mergers stability core.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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This page was last updated on 2008-11-1.

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