Note on a Two-Player All-pay Auction with Asymmetrical Bidders and Incomplete Information
AbstractThe present paper analyzes a general class of first-price all-pay auctions where two players have different "bidding technologies" and one bidder has a head start advantage over his/her opponent. Equilibria are characterized for the complete information setting and for the case where there is incomplete asymmetrical information. In particular, the handicapped player is uncertain about the size of the opponent’s advantage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy) in its series Economics Department Working Papers with number 2010-EP06.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
All-pay auctions and Auction theory and Games with asymmetrical players and Incomplete information games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-01-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-23 (Game Theory)
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