Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification
AbstractUltimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject`s behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presets a taxonomy of certification, and provides experimental evidence supporting the commonly observed use of rankings in certificates, as well as the restriction of awareness by certifiers to increase revenue. Regulatory implications are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 87.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2002
Date of revision:
ultimatum; bargaining; experiments; certification; asymmetric information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
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