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Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

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Author Info
Luisa Carpente (Universidade da Coruna)
Ignacio Garcia-Jurado (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Balbina Casas-Mendez (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Anne van den Nouweland (University of Oregon)
Abstract

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.

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File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2003-5_Carpente_Values_Games_Cooperate.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2003-5.

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Length: 33
Date of creation: 27 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2003-5

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "Characterizing cautious choice," Discussion Paper 54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Luisa Carpente & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Balbina Casas-Mendez & Anne van den Nouweland, 2004. "The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2004-3, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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