IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ore/uoecwp/2003-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

Author

Listed:
  • Luisa Carpente

    (Universidade da Coruna)

  • Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Balbina Casas-Mendez

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Anne van den Nouweland

    (University of Oregon)

Abstract

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Carpente & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Balbina Casas-Mendez & Anne van den Nouweland, 2003. "Values for strategic games in which players cooperate," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-5, University of Oregon Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2003-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2003-5_Carpente_Values_Games_Cooperate.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2003-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bill Harbaugh (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuorus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.