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Taxes or Grants: What Revenue Source for Sub-Central Governments?

Author

Listed:
  • Hansjörg Blöchliger

    (OECD)

  • Oliver Petzold

Abstract

This paper analyses trends in and driving forces of the revenue composition of sub-central governments (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased from 31 to 33%, while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17%, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant systems of most countries are much larger than required by equalization. Moreover, rather than smoothing out SCG revenue fluctuations over the cycle, grants often tend to exacerbate them. Finally, there is some evidence that grants reduce SCG tax raising effort, inflate SCG spending and increase SCG deficits and debt. The economic crisis will both sharply reduce SCG’s own tax revenues and – via budget constraints at the central level – increase pressure on the grant system. The crisis could hence help rethink the SCG revenue mix, their tax structure and the size and design of intergovernmental transfers. Impôts ou transferts : quels revenus pour les administrations infranationales ? Ce document analyse les tendances et les déterminants de la composition des revenus des administrations infra-nationales (AI). Entre 1995 et 2005, la part des dépenses des AI dans les dépenses publiques totales a augmenté de 31 à 33%, alors que leur participation aux recettes fiscales restait stable autour de 17%, accentuant de ce fait la dépendance des AI envers les transferts intergouvernementaux. Bien que l’égalité d’accès aux services publics soit la raison la plus souvent invoquée pour justifier ces transferts, les systèmes de transferts sont en réalité souvent bien plus importants que ceux qu’impliquerait la simple péréquation. Par ailleurs, les transferts ont tendance à amplifier plutôt qu’à réduire les fluctuations de revenus au cours du cycle. Finalement, il semblerait que les transferts réduisent l’effort fiscal des AI tout en augmentant leurs dépenses et donc leurs déficits et leur dette. La crise économique en cours à la fois va réduire fortement les impôts propres des AI et – suite aux contraintes budgétaires au niveau central – augmenter la pression sur le système des transferts. La crise pourrait donc inciter à repenser la composition des revenues des AI, la structure de leurs impôts et la taille et le design des transferts intergouvernementaux.

Suggested Citation

  • Hansjörg Blöchliger & Oliver Petzold, 2009. "Taxes or Grants: What Revenue Source for Sub-Central Governments?," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 706, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:706-en
    DOI: 10.1787/223111363085
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hansjörg Blöchliger, 2013. "Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 1. How Much, What Policies?," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1070, OECD Publishing.
    2. Margit Schratzenstaller, 2016. "Technik und Kriterien für eine Stärkung der Steuerautonomie der österreichischen Bundesländer," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 89(6), pages 411-422, June.
    3. Raghbendra Jha & Hari K. Nagarajan & Anirudh Tagat, 2019. "Restricted and Unrestricted Fiscal Grants and Tax Effort of Panchayats in India," ASARC Working Papers 2019-02, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    4. Junxue Jia & Siying Ding & Yongzheng Liu, 2018. "Decentralization, Incentives, and Tax Enforcement," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1819, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    5. Ms. Izabela Karpowicz, 2012. "Narrowing Vertical Fiscal Imbalances in Four European Countries," IMF Working Papers 2012/091, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Fedesarrollo, 2018. "Evaluación de los impactos causados en las regiones productoras de hidrocarburos y minerales con el actual Sistema General de Regalías," Informes de Investigación 17258, Fedesarrollo.
    7. Hansjörg Blöchliger & José Maria Pinero Campos, 2011. "Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 872, OECD Publishing.
    8. Balázs Égert, 2011. "Bringing French Public Debt Down: The Options for Fiscal Consolidation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 858, OECD Publishing.
    9. Fedesarrollo, 2018. "Evaluación de los impactos causados en las regiones productoras de hidrocarburos y minerales con el actual Sistema General de Regalías," Informes de Investigación 17194, Fedesarrollo.
    10. Aadil Ahmad Ganaie & Sajad Ahmad Bhat & Bandi Kamaiah & N. A. Khan, 2018. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Evidence from Indian States," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 7(1), pages 83-108, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; fédéralisme fiscal; impôts locaux; intergovernmental grants; local tax system; transferts intergouvernementaux;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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