Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Alain de Serres
• Pablo Antolin

This paper provides estimates of the implicit fiscal assets as well as of the evolution over time of fiscal costs and revenues related to tax-favoured retirement saving regimes in 17 OECD countries, taking into account current and future contributions, asset accumulation and withdrawals, all of which will be strongly influenced by future demographic developments. The main results show that in the case where tax incentives are assumed to lead essentially to saving diversion rather than creation, the net budgetary cost of tax-favoured schemes would remain large, despite the sharp rise in revenues collected from withdrawals as population ages. The paper shows that this cost would significantly be reduced if tax-favoured schemes succeed in promoting additional private savings. It then explores a number of policy options to maximize the amount of additional saving ...

Lmplications budgétaires à long terme des plans d’épargne retraite à traitement fiscal favorable

Cette étude présente, pour 17 pays de l’OCDE, les résultats d’estimation des avoirs nets budgétaires ainsi que de l’évolution sur le temps des coûts et revenus fiscaux liés aux plans privés d’épargne retraite à traitement fiscal favorable. Les estimations prennent en compte les contributions, l’accumulation d’actifs et les prestations présentes et futures qui seront influencées par les changements démographiques à venir. Les principaux résultats suggèrent que dans l’hypothèse où les incitatifs fiscaux ont peu d’effet sur la creation nette d’épargne et conduisent plutôt à une réallocation de l’épargne existante, le coût budgétaire net des plans d’épargne retraite à traitement fiscal favorable demeurera élevé et ce, en dépit de la forte croissance des recettes fiscales anticipée, liée à l’augmentation importante du nombre de retraités par rapport au nombre de contributeurs. L’étude montre en outre que le coût budgétaire est sensiblement réduit dans l’hypothèse où ces plans ...

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Paper provided by OECD, Economics Department in its series OECD Economics Department Working Papers with number 393.

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Date of creation: 24 Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:393-en

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Keywords: ageing; fiscal revenues; private pensions; public deficits; retirement savings; tax-deferred; tax-favoured; déficit public; épargne pour la retraite; fiscalité favorable; pensions privées; vieillissement;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2005-08-13 (All new papers)
• NEP-MAC-2005-08-13 (Macroeconomics)
• NEP-PBE-2005-08-13 (Public Economics)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.