The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases
AbstractWe analyze and contrast the US and EU antitrust standards on mixed bundling and tying. We apply our analysis to the US and EU cases against Microsoft on the issue of tying new products (Internet Explorer in the US, and Windows Media Player in the EU) with Windows as well as to cases brought in Europe and in the United States on bundling discounts. We conclude that there are differences between the EC and US antitrust law on the choice of the relevant analogy for bundled rebates (predatory price standard or foreclosure standard) and the implementation of the distinct product and coercion test for tying practices. The second important difference between the two jurisdictions concerns the interpretation of the requirement of anticompetitive foreclosure. It seems to us that in Europe, consumer detriment is found easily and it is not always a requirement for the application of Article 82, or at least that the standard of proof of a consumer detriment for tying cases is lower than in the US.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 07-47.
Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision: Dec 2007
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Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/
tying; bundling; foreclosure; requirement contracts; monopolization; Microsoft; predatory pricing;
Other versions of this item:
- Economides, Nicholas & Lianos, Ioannis, 2008. "The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases," Working paper 459, Regulation2point0.
- Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, 2008. "The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases," Working Papers 08-1, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-01-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EEC-2008-01-05 (European Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2008-01-05 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-LAW-2008-01-05 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2008-01-05 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2008-01-05 (Network Economics)
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