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Subjective Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Alain de Janvry
  • Guojun He
  • Elisabeth Sadoulet
  • Shaoda Wang
  • Qiong Zhang

Abstract

Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to local leadership could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to impressing/pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more important and observable to the evaluator. Importantly, we show that introducing uncertainty about the evaluator’s identity discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and improves bureaucratic work performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain de Janvry & Guojun He & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Shaoda Wang & Qiong Zhang, 2022. "Subjective Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 30621, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30621
    Note: DEV LS POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrzad B. Baktash & Uwe Jirjahn, 2023. "Are Managers More Machiavellian Than Other Employees?," Research Papers in Economics 2023-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    2. Suwen Zheng & Chunhui Ye & Yunli Bai, 2023. "Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households’ Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-34, May.
    3. Enzo Brox & Michael Lechner, 2024. "Teamwork and Spillover Effects in Performance Evaluations," Papers 2403.15200, arXiv.org.
    4. Lea Heursen & Svenja Friess & Marina Chugunova, 2023. "Reputational Concerns and Advice-Seeking at Work," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 447, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Gall, Thomas & Hu, Xiaocheng & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2023. "Incentivizing Team Leaders: A Firm-Level Experiment on Subjective Performance Evaluation of Leadership Skills," IZA Discussion Papers 16123, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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