Punishment, Reward And The Fortunes Of States
AbstractExisting theories explain the rise and fall of states either by random factors specific to each state or by a life cycle to which any state eventually succumbs. However, neither approach is able to explain systematic patterns such as the tendency toward smaller political units during the millennium from 400 to 1400 A.D. and the movement in the opposite direction over the last six centuries. Here it is argued that such changes are due to innovations in the technology of information processing and military control that alter the cost of generating rewards and imposing punishment. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 8902.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
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information ; technologie ; militarisme ; impots;
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- Teng, Jimmy, 2012. "Military competition and size and composition of economy and government," MPRA Paper 37968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Apr 2012.
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