Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 8139.
Length: 30P. pages
Date of creation: 1981
Date of revision:
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Assurance ; Information ; Risque;
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- Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587713 is not listed on IDEAS
- Heski Bar-Isaac & Vicente Cuñat, 2012.
"Long-term Debt and Hidden Borrowing,"
12-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Russell Cooper, 1984. "Insurance, Flexibility and Non-contingent Trades," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 691, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
- Islam, Zahirul & Turvey, Calum G. & Hoy, Michael, 1999. "A Model Of Agricultural Insurance In Evaluating Asymmetric Information Problems," Working Papers 34103, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
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