Strategic aspects of bundling
AbstractThe increase of bundle supply has become widespread in several sectors (for instance in telecommunications and energy fields). This paper review relates strategic aspects of bundling. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze profitability of bundling strategies according to the degree of competition and the characteristics of goods. Moreover, bundling can be used as price discrimination tool, screening device or entry barriers. In monopoly case bundling strategy is efficient to sort consumers in different categories in order to capture a maximum of surplus. However, when competition increases, the profitability on bundling strategies depends on correlation of consumers reservations values.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) with number 08.03.74.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Product bundling; foreclosure; price discrimination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-04-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2008-04-29 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-IND-2008-04-29 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2008-04-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2008-04-29 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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