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Third Party Access pricing to the network, secondary capacity market and economic optimum : the case of natural gas

Author

Listed:
  • David, L.
  • Percebois, J.

Abstract

The gas deregulation process implies crucial choices concerning access to transportation networks. These choices deal with the nature, the structure and the level of access fees. This paper proposes an evaluation of different systems implemented both in Europe and North America, in relation to normative pricing references. The rules according to which shippers can buy or sell capacity represent another kind of choice that Regulators have to make. This paper proposes a simple model which demonstrates that secondary market prices should not be subject to a cap and emphasizes the need of a 'use-it-or-lose-it' rule on this market.

Suggested Citation

  • David, L. & Percebois, J., 2002. "Third Party Access pricing to the network, secondary capacity market and economic optimum : the case of natural gas," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 02.09.36, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  • Handle: RePEc:mop:credwp:02.09.36
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    File URL: http://www.creden.univ-montp1.fr/downloads/cahiers/CC-02-09-36.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bermúdez, Alfredo & González-Díaz, Julio & González-Diéguez, Francisco J. & González-Rueda, Ángel M., 2016. "Gas transmission networks in Europe: Connections between different entry-exit tariff methodologies," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 839-851.
    2. Jing Xu & Michelle Hallack & Miguel Vazquez, 2017. "Applying a third party access model for China’s gas pipeline network: an independent pipeline operator and congestion rent transfer," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 72-97, February.

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