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Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof

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  • A. van den Nouweland
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    Abstract

    I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.

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    File URL: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/downloads/wpapers-07/1003.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 1003.

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    Length: 8 pages
    Date of creation: 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1003

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    Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
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    Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
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    Cited by:
    1. Eric Bahel & Hans Haller, 2012. "Cycles with Undistinguished Actions and Extended Rock-Paper-Scissors Games," Working Papers e07-34, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Eric Bahel, 2011. "Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games," Working Papers e07-31, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.

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