AbstractI study Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as investments in public infrastructures that are alternative compared to direct public investments. I consider different forms of PPP, discussing their relative advantages from the point of view of incomplete contract theory and principal-agent relations. I also provide an empirical investigation concerning recent PPP projects in Europe and Italy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 120.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2007-08-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2007-08-08 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-PUB-2007-08-08 (Public Finance)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
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