E–stability and stability of adaptive learning in models with asymmetric information
AbstractThe paper demonstrates how the E–stability principle introduced by Evans and Honkapohja  can be applied to models with heterogeneous and private information in order to assess the stability of rational expectations equilibria under learning. The paper extends already known stability results for the Grossman and Stiglitz  model to a more general case with many differentially informed agents and to the case where information is endogenously acquired by optimizing agents. In both cases it turns out that the rational expectations equilibrium of the model is inherently E-stable and thus locally stable under recursive least squares learning.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 69.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://leuphana.de/institute/ivwl.html
Adaptive Learning; Eductive Stability; Rational Expectations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-12-15 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2007-12-15 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell,
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- Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1415-30, November.
- Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Assessing Rational Expectations 2: "Eductive" Stability in Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262072580, December.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980.
"On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association,
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- Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
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