Bonding Social Capital and Corruption: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis
AbstractThis paper considers the relationship between corruption and bonding social capital, which is characterised by high level of particularised trust and reciprocity amongst families and close friends. The main conjecture is that bonding social capital is likely to increase corruption and that it affects corruption not only directly, but also indirectly through other factors. Empirical results from the third wave of the World Value Survey confirm that bonding social capital leads to higher level of perceived corruption, particularly public and political corruption, when it discourages trust and cooperation towards outsiders. Bonding social capital also increases corruption indirectly by reducing opportunistic behaviour and imposing peer pressure on the ingroup members to reciprocate in a corrupt exchange i.e. to ‘return the favour’. This mechanism makes a corrupt transaction more predictable, i.e. increasing the confidence that the ‘goods’ will be delivered as promised and thus, leads to high level of corruption.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics in its series Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers with number 27.2007.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
Corruption; Social Capital; Social Norms; Social Networks;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
- R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2007-10-06 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-10-06 (Regulation)
- NEP-SOC-2007-10-06 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Jacopo Costa & Roberto Ricciuti, 2013. "Sources for the Euro Crisis: Bad Regulation and Weak Institutions in Peripheral Europe," Working Papers 15/2013, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- Grießhaber, Nicolas & Geys, Benny, 2011. "Civic engagement and corruption in 20 European democracies," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-103, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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