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Die Katastrophen-Versicherung in Spanien

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Author Info
Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG
Abstract

This paper studies the state building insurance monopoly in Spain, the Consorcio the Compensacion de Seguros. It is shown that, just like its Swiss counterparts, the Consorcio operates with exceptionally low transactions costs. Furthermore it allows the supply of a very low cost insurance cover in a domain, where competition would usually lead to market failure due to problems of adverse selection. The existence of the Consorcio is in contradiction with the 3rd EU guidelines on the insurance market, however Spain managed to get an exemption.

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File URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/9716.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9716.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Gebäudeversicherung in Europa - Die Grenzen des Wettbewerbs, Haupt Verlag, 2002, pp. 63-86
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9716

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Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.65
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications-english/e-cahiers.htm

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Related research
Keywords: catastrophe insurance; state monopoly; adverse selection; Spain; EU-legislation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
L99 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Other

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This page was last updated on 2010-2-4.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.