IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lau/crdeep/21.04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited

Author

Listed:
  • Bettina Klaus

Abstract

We consider a variation of the housing market model a la Shapley and Scarf (1974) where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences (see Klaus and Meo, 2021). Then, if preferences are either all demand lexicographic or all supply lexicographic, we characterize the corresponding top trading cycles rule by individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and strategy-proofness. Since on the lexicographic preference domains the strong core can be multi-valued, our result sheds light on the fact that the properties that also characterized the strong core rule for Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Ma, 1994) characterize the top trading cycles rule and not the strong core rule (or correspondence).

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus, 2021. "Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.unil.ch/de/files/live/sites/de/files/working-papers/21.04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hong, Miho & Park, Jaeok, 2022. "Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Core; characterization; externalities; housing markets; top trading cycles rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christina Seld (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deelsch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.