Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

CEO Compensation: Too Much is not Enough !

Contents:

Author Info

  • Laurent Weill

    ()
    (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg)

Abstract

This paper conducts an analysis of the relationship between CEO compensation and managerial performance on a large panel of US public firms, by taking into account the different components of CEO compensation. We estimate a stochastic frontier model in which managerial performance is related to compensation components. We find a positive and significant influence of CEO compensation on managerial performance, with a differentiated impact for components of compensation. We show that increases in salary, bonus, and options grants tend to enhance managerial performance. Our findings tend therefore to support the view that compensation contracts can be designed to increase managerial performance.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2009/2009-03.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2009-03.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2009-03

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 61, Avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
Phone: (33) 3 90 41 41 30
Fax: (33) 3 90 41 40 50
Web page: http://ifs.unistra.fr/large
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Executive compensation; corporate governance; stochastic frontier.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2009-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christophe J. Godlewski).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.