CEO Compensation: Too Much is not Enough !
AbstractThis paper conducts an analysis of the relationship between CEO compensation and managerial performance on a large panel of US public firms, by taking into account the different components of CEO compensation. We estimate a stochastic frontier model in which managerial performance is related to compensation components. We find a positive and significant influence of CEO compensation on managerial performance, with a differentiated impact for components of compensation. We show that increases in salary, bonus, and options grants tend to enhance managerial performance. Our findings tend therefore to support the view that compensation contracts can be designed to increase managerial performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2009-03.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
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Executive compensation; corporate governance; stochastic frontier.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-02-28 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2009-02-28 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-EFF-2009-02-28 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-LAB-2009-02-28 (Labour Economics)
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