The Timing of Bets and the Favorite-Longshot Bias
AbstractIn parimutuel betting markets, it has been observed that proportionally too many bets are placed on longshots, late bets are more informative than early bets, and a sizeable fraction of bets are placed early. We propose an explanation for these facts based on equilibrium incentives of privately informed rational bettors, who profit from betting against bettors with recreational motives. We show that small rational bettors who act on private information have an incentive to wait until the last minute, and then bet without access to the information of the others. Once the distribution of bets is revealed, the longshot is recognized to be less likely to win than was originally thought. When acting on common information instead, bettors have an incentive to place early bets in order to preempt others from exploiting the same information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Finance Research Unit in its series FRU Working Papers with number 2004/12.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
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parimutuel betting; favorite-longshot bias; private information; timing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
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- Frederic Koessler & Charles Noussair & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006.
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