Is Economic Analysis of Any Help in Studies of Legitimacy in the EU?
AbstractThe transaction cost approach in economics has been applied in theorizing how Europe is governed. In providing a functionalist explanation of political organization, it encourages beliefs that reforms improving organizational efficiency also increase the legitimacy of European leadership. This paper discusses institutional perspectives on how democratic legitimacy is built by those, who aspire to rule the EU. An economist’s view will be discussed against a background of models of legitimacy by Scharpf and Schmitter. In addition, a governance practice directed to diffusion policy is fenced off and a future empirical study is outlined.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 04-32.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision: Dec 2004
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
legitimacy; multi-level governance; transaction costs; social norms; institutional leverage;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2005-01-15 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-01-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-01-05 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.