Jens Leth Hougaard (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) Bezalel Peleg (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Lars Peter Østerdal (Institute of Public Health, University of Copenhagen)
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This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonsrtates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
03-29.
Length: 14 pages Date of creation: Apr 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0329
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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