The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence

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The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Scheme Choice: Empirical Evidence

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Jan Tjeerd Boom (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics)
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen (Aarhus School of Business, Dept. of Economics)

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Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

Abstract

The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the preferences of industry and environmental organizations for national environmental policy instrument and for international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we present data that gives an indication about the level of rent-seeking by these groups at the international level. The aim of this paper is to identify which instruments are politically most feasible.

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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 00-19.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0019

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2001-10-29 (All new papers)
NEP-PBE-2001-10-29 (Public Economics)
NEP-POL-2001-10-29 (Positive Political Economics)

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