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Strategic Lengths of Tenancy Contracts

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Author Info
Jaideep Roy (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics)
Konstantinos Serfes (SUNY at Stony Brook)

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Abstract

In a multi-period environment, time is certainly an added dimension in which the principal can differentiate in search of better screening contracts. This idea is used in a two-period model of agriculture without any form of uncertainty, where the landlord offers separating tenurial contracts to screen tenants of different skills, when the skill is private information. The paper shows that a risk neutral landlord wishing to hire a risk averse tenant will always find it optimal to offer a long term fixed rent contract to a high-skilled tenant and a short term sharecropping contract to a low-skilled one.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/Research/Publications/pink/2000/0017.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 00-17.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0017

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Related research
Keywords: short-term versus long-term tenancy contracts; risk aversion; screening;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
J43 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Agricultural Labor Markets
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


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