Retaliation and the Role for Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation
AbstractModels of evolutionary game theory have shown that punishment may be an adaptive behaviour in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but questions the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. This study provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of retaliating behaviour in the context of repeated social dilemmas and analyses the role punishment can play in the evolution of cooperation under these conditions. We show a punishing strategy can pave the way for a partially-cooperative equilibrium of conditional cooperators and defecting types and, under positive mutation rates, foster the cooperation level in this equilibrium by prompting reluctant cooperators to cooperate. However, when rare mutations occur, it cannot sustain cooperation by itself as punishment costs favour the spread of non-punishing cooperators
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Konstanz in its series Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz with number 2012-13.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 29 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2012. "Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation," TWI Research Paper Series 75, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Irenaeus Wolff, 2012. "Retaliation and the Role for Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation," TWI Research Paper Series 77, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-07-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-07-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2012-07-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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