Bayesian-Cournot Competition

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Bayesian-Cournot Competition

Author Info

Ji-Tian Jeng () (Keele University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

We consider a model of Cournot competition where firms have incomplete information about their rivals’ costs. The equilibrium concept we use is that of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Our analysis is particularly novel since we recognise that each firm’s payoff is determined by its strategy choice and the unweighted sum of all firms’ strategy choices. By exploiting this "aggregative structure", we are able to characterise equilibria in a very simple way, and based on this characterisation we develop sufficient conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium. A comparative statics analysis is also carried out.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Economic Research, Keele University in its series Keele Economics Research Papers with number KERP 2005/01.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2005/01

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
Phone: +44 (0)1782 584581
Fax: +44 (0)1782 717577
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Web page: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/
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Postal: Centre for Economic Research, Research Institute for Public Policy and Management, Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Web: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
NEP-COM-2006-05-13 (Industrial Competition)
NEP-MIC-2006-05-13 (Microeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Game Theory and Information 0211003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/16, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
- Hartley, Roger & Richard Cornes, 2003. "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 99, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
Novshek, William, 1985. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(1), pages 85-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Novshek, William., 1984. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," Working Papers 517, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
Other versions:
- Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Todd Sandler, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 99/02, Department of Economics, Keele University.
Other versions:
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. " Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 499-509. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley, 2004. "Partial Equilibrium Analysis in a Market Game:the Strategic Marshallian Cross," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2004/07, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2003. "Aggregative Public Goods Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000063, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2003. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2003/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2000. "Joint Production Games And Share Functions," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/07, Department of Economics, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2003. "Loss Aversion and the Tullock Paradox," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2003/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]

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