Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions
AbstractWe use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic underbidding. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2008-023.
Date of creation: 18 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
War of attrition; dynamic bidding; all-pay auction; stabilisation; volunteer's dilemma; experiment;
Other versions of this item:
- Oliver Kirchkamp,, 2006. "Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0607, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-03-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2008-03-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-03-25 (Game Theory)
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