The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study
AbstractThis note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeldâ€™s (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the beneï¬ts and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2007-074.
Date of creation: 30 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Control; Experimental Economics; Incentives; Intrinsic Motivation; Trust.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-11-10 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-11-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-11-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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