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The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study

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Author Info
Matteo Ploner () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)
Anthony Ziegelmeyer () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

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Abstract

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the beneï¬ts and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number 2007-074.

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Date of creation: 30 Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-074

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Related research
Keywords: Control; Experimental Economics; Incentives; Intrinsic Motivation; Trust.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

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