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Wage Flexibility in Ongoing Employment Relations - An Experiment with a Stochastic Labor Market -

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Author Info
Siegfried K. Berninghaus () (Institut fuer Wirtschaftstheorie und Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe)
Sabrina Bleich (Institut fuer Wirtschaftstheorie und Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe)
Werner Gueth () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)
Abstract

Facing a stochastic market wage, which is independent of their own hiring policy, employers offer contracts specifying ï¬xed wage, revenue share and employment duration. In ongoing employment relations it depends on the treatment whether ï¬xed wages can be only increased or also decreased. Will the uncertainty of the future market wage and less wage flexibility lead to temporary employment? And, if not, will employers adjust wages to changing market wages and will workers in ongoing employment relations react to wage decreases via effort choices? Our results partly question empirical claims, e.g. of Bewley (1995), and conï¬rm the tendency to establish ongoing employment relations. Granting more wage flexibility to employers altogether questions rather than enhances effciency since it induces opportunistic wage cuts to which employees react with lower efforts.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number 2007-072.

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Date of creation: 10 Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-072

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Related research
Keywords: noncooperative game; labor contracts; labor market flexibility; principal-agent theory; experimental economics;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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