Constitutional Review and Democratic Consolidation: A Literature Review
AbstractThis paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review across the world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades. Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has the judiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, does constitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, the literature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing if there is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislature and the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, political balance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO) in its series IDE Discussion Papers with number 192.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in IDE Discussion Paper. No. 192. 2009.
Postal: Publication Office, IDE 3-2-2 Wakaba, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba 261-8545 JAPAN
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- NEP-ALL-2009-08-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-08-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2009-08-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-08-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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