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Shapley Value And Lindahl Equilibrium For An Economy With A Public Good: An Example

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  • Gardner, Roy

Abstract

In an economy, there are essentially three approaches to the problem of value and distribution: pure competition (competitive equilibrium), coalition power (the core), and fair division (the Shapley value) [5]. In an economy without public goods but with a continuum of agents, all three approaches are equivalent, in the sense that they lead to the same allocation of goods and the same imputation of utility [1, 2]. For an economy with public goods, competitive equilibrium is replaced by the analogous concept of Lindahl equilibrium, the other approaches remaining the same.

Suggested Citation

  • Gardner, Roy, 1975. "Shapley Value And Lindahl Equilibrium For An Economy With A Public Good: An Example," ISU General Staff Papers 197510010700001021, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:197510010700001021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J, 1975. "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 611-646, July.
    2. Muench, Thomas J., 1972. "The core and the Lindahl equilibrium of an economy with a public good: an example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 241-255, April.
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