The siting of public facilities, such as prisons, airports or incinerators for hazardous wastes faces social rejection by local population. These public goods have a private bad aspect which creates a siting problem: all communities benefit from its existence, but only one (the host) bears its cost. We tackle this inevitable asymmetry from a responsibility and equity viewpoint: the host should not be perceived as a "victim". To realize this objective, we design a method to share the total cost (the disutility of the host plus the construction cost) in a way that bypasses the natural asymmetry of the problem. We also introduce a basic incentives property which has strangely been overlooked in the existing literature: voluntary participation.
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Paper provided by HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée in its series Cahiers de recherche with number
07-14.
Length: 21 pages Date of creation: Dec 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0714
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