Employee Control and Oligopoly in a Free Market Economy
AbstractWe study duopolistic markets where a profit-maximizing firm competes with an employee-controlled firm that maximizes value-added per employee. We first study an industry with Cournot competition. We show that the presence of an employee-controlled firm does not affect the equilibrium number of firms, lowers aggregate output, increases price and reduces social welfare. The employee-controlled firm has a smaller equilibrium output than its competitor. For Hotelling type competition in a market with diversified products, we show that equilibrium locations are not affected by employee control, that prices increase and that social welfare decreases. The market share of the employee-controlled firm is lower than that of its competitor. Surprisingly, the profits of both firms can increase when control is transferred from stockholders to employees in one of them. Finally, we show that employees would not want to buy a firm from its owners.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 11.
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, n°33, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, janvier-mars 1994, p.�29-50.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 89
Fax: + 33 (0)5 61 12 86 37
Web page: http://www.idei.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Helmuth CREMER & Jacques CRÉMER, 1994. "Employee Control and Oligopoly in a Free Market Economy," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 33, pages 29-49.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Crémer, Jacques, 1994. "Employee Control and Oligopoly in a Free Market Economy," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mikami, Kazuhiko, 2003. "Market power and the form of enterprise: capitalist firms, worker-owned firms and consumer cooperatives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 533-552, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.