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Votación obligatoria y desigualdad del ingreso en una muestra representativa de países

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  • Alberto Chong

    ()

  • Mauricio Olivera

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la vinculación entre la votación obligatoria y la distribución del ingreso en una muestra representativa de países de todo el mundo. Nuestro análisis empírico de un grupo representativo de 91 países durante el período de 1960 a 2000 muestra que la votación obligatoria, cuando se hace cumplir estrictamente, mejora la distribución del ingreso según el coeficiente Gini y los ingresos del quintil más bajo de la población. Nuestros hallazgos son valederos ante cambios y adiciones a nuestra base comparativa especificada. Dado que los países más pobres sufren de una desigualdad del ingreso relativamente mayor, puede tener sentido fomentar tales mecanismos de votación en regiones en desarrollo como América Latina. En esta propuesta se supone que los costos burocráticos del diseño y la puesta en práctica de dichos mecanismos no son prohibitivos.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4414.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4414

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  1. Francis O'Toole & Eric Strobl, 1995. "Compulsory Voting And Government Spending," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 271-280, November.
  2. Bourguignon, F. & Verdier, T., 1997. "Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth," DELTA Working Papers 97-10, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. Alberto Chong, 2001. "Inequality, Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve?," Research Department Publications 4253, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  4. Li, Hongyi & Squire, Lyn & Zou, Heng-fu, 1998. "Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income Inequality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(446), pages 26-43, January.
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  8. W. Mark Crain & Mary L. Leonard, 1993. "The Right Versus The Obligation To Vote: Effects On Cross-Country Government Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 43-51, 03.
  9. Bourguignon, F. & Morrisson, C., 1995. "Inequality and Development: The Role of Dualism," DELTA Working Papers 95-32, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  10. Tilman Börgers, 2001. "Costly Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000232, David K. Levine.
  11. Chong, Alberto & Calderon, Cesar, 2000. "Institutional Quality and Income Distribution," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(4), pages 761-86, July.
  12. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  13. Barro, Robert J & Lee, Jong Wha, 1996. "International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 218-23, May.
  14. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  15. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June.
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