Compulsory Voting And Government Spending
AbstractIn a recent issue of Economics and Politics Crain and Leonard (1993) described the effects of compulsory voting on government spending. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, problems in Crain and Leonard's approach are identified. Their use of the median-voter model appears inconsistent and their choice of government consumption rather than government expenditure is questionable. Second, this paper begins an analysis of the composition of government expenditure. Cross-country data tentatively suggests that non-voters benefit relative to voters from government expenditure on health, housing and transfer payments while voters benefit from government expenditure on defense and economic services.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics in its series Economics Technical Papers with number 944.
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
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- Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer, 1992.
"Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 101-116, Summer.
- W. Mark Crain & Mary L. Leonard, 1993. "The Right Versus The Obligation To Vote: Effects On Cross-Country Government Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 43-51, 03.
- Dalibor Eterovic & Nicolás Eterovic, 2012. "Political competition versus electoral participation: effects on government’s size," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 333-363, December.
- Keith Jakee & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2006. "Is compulsory voting more democratic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 61-75, October.
- Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "Votación obligatoria y desigualdad del ingreso en una muestra representativa de países," Research Department Publications 4414, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Jaitman, Laura, 2013. "The causal effect of compulsory voting laws on turnout: Does skill matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 79-93.
- Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "On Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality in a Cross-Section of Countries," Research Department Publications 4413, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Dalibor Eterovic & Nicolas Eterovic, 2010. "Political Competition vs. PoliticalParticipation: Effects on Government's Size," Working Papers wp_006, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
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