Inspection Intensity and Market Structure
AbstractAn investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms' incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University in its series Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications with number 05-wp412.
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
inspection policies; market regulation; regulatory funding.;
Other versions of this item:
- StÃ©phan Marette, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp412, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.