On the Realizability of Social Preferences in Three-Party Parliamentary
AbstractIt is widely held that compared with a legislature with a single majority party, a multi-party legislature achieves more precise representation of society. But the scope of such an advantage that a multi-party system has is rarely discussed. We study the range of social preferences that a three-party system can realize through majority voting. We present a procedure to construct a three-party system that will induce the policy choice specified by a given social preference relation. We provide a sufficient condition for a social preference relation to be compatible with some three-party system. The condition describes a certain restriction on the structure of cycles of social preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series with number gd12-290.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2013-04-06 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-04-06 (Positive Political Economics)
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