IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hok/dpaper/272.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Transfer Arrangement, Labor Migration and Community Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Yamada, Daichi

Abstract

An informal transfer arrangement within a community redistributes incomes. While this may improve the welfare by mitigating the income inequality, it will also a ect households’ decisions on labor migration, a way to expand incomes. This paper theoretically examines the transfer arrangement that maximize the community welfare, taking into account its e ect on endogenous labor migration decisions. The result shows that the welfare is maximized when the redistribution through transfer is limited. It also presents an alternative explanation for empirical findings of limited transfer arrangement.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamada, Daichi, 2014. "Transfer Arrangement, Labor Migration and Community Welfare," Discussion paper series. A 272, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hok:dpaper:272
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/55296
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/55296/1/DPA272.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    2. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 209-244.
    3. Dean Yang, 2011. "Migrant Remittances," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(3), pages 129-152, Summer.
    4. Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001. "Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, And The Family: Evidence From Transfer Behavior In Low-Income Rural Areas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 389-407, August.
    5. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February.
    6. Ravallion, Martin & Dearden, Lorraine, 1988. "Social Security in a "Moral Economy": An Empirical Analysis for Java," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(1), pages 36-44, February.
    7. Lucas, Robert E B & Stark, Oded, 1985. "Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 901-918, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jonathan Robinson, 2012. "Limited Insurance within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 140-164, October.
    2. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August.
    3. Juan M. Gallego & Mariapia Mendola, 2013. "Labour Migration and Social Networks Participation in Southern Mozambique," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 80(320), pages 721-759, October.
    4. Grimm, Michael & Hartwig, Renate & Lay, Jann, 2017. "Does forced solidarity hamper investment in small and micro enterprises?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 827-846.
    5. Mobarak, A. Mushfiq & Rosenzweig, Mark R., 2012. "Selling formal Insurance to the Informally Insured," Center Discussion Papers 121671, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    6. Ingela Alger & Laura Juarez & Miriam Juarez-Torres & Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2020. "Do Informal Transfers Induce Lower Efforts? Evidence from Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in Rural Mexico," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(1), pages 107-171.
    7. Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2021. "Altruism and Risk Sharing in Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1488-1521.
    8. Gary Charness & Garance Genicot, 2009. "Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite‐Horizon Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 796-825, April.
    9. Pamela Jakiela & Owen Ozier, 2016. "Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(1), pages 231-268.
    10. Morduch, Jonathan, 1999. "Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 14(2), pages 187-207, August.
    11. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/cpem82ltk8fgprl50i20pgomf is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Joachim De Weerdt & Kalle Hirvonen, 2016. "Risk Sharing and Internal Migration," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 63-86.
    13. Tessa Bold & Stefan Dercon, 2009. "Contract Design in Insurance Groups," CSAE Working Paper Series 2009-04, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    14. Jonathan P. Thomas & Timothy Worrall, 2002. "Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(3), pages 308-352, August.
    15. Sarolta Laczo, 2010. "Estimating Dynamic Contracts: Risk Sharing in Village Economies," 2010 Meeting Papers 687, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Di Falco, Salvatore & Feri, Francesco & Pin, Paolo & Vollenweider, Xavier, 2018. "Ties that bind: Network redistributive pressure and economic decisions in village economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 123-131.
    17. Paan Jindapon & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2022. "Income Interdependence and Informal Risk Sharing Under the Shadow of the Future," PIER Discussion Papers 191, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    18. Dean Yang, 2005. "Coping With Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2001," Working Papers 534, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    19. Marcel Fafchamps & Flore Gubert, 2007. "Risk Sharing and Network Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 75-79, May.
    20. HwaJung Choi, 2007. "Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 21(2), pages 219-248, May.
    21. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/cpem82ltk8fgprl50i20pgomf is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Grimard, Franque, 1997. "Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 391-422, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Informal transfer; Labor migration;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hok:dpaper:272. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Hokkaido University Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fehokjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.