On the General Existence of Pure Strategy Political Competition Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Party-Faction Models

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On the General Existence of Pure Strategy Political Competition Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Party-Faction Models

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Naoki Yoshihara

Abstract

In this paper, we consider political competition games of two parties in multi-dimensional policy spaces, where the two parties have two factions, opportunists and militants, that intra-party bargain with each other. In such a game, we adopt the party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) [Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001)] as an appropriate solution concept, and examine the general existence problem of this. In particular, we suppose that any faction of each party does not necessarily have dictatorial power. We then provide a general existence theorem for PUNE in this class of games.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a511.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a511

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2009-02-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-GTH-2009-02-14 (Game Theory)
NEP-POL-2009-02-14 (Positive Political Economics)

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