Does Competition Increase Economic Efficiency in Swedish County Councils?
AbstractThe Swedish health care system is to a large extent publicly managed by 21 local county councils. During recent years there has been a movement were local county councils have opted to allow more of the production to be performed by alternative producers (i.e. private firms, cooperatives etc.). The purpose of this paper is thus to study if local county councils who has a large proportion of health care performed by alternative producers are more economically efficient than other county councils. The results indicate that county councils with more alternative caregivers are supplying their services more efficiently.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 703.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Economic efficiency in health care; Data Envelopment Analysis; Tobit regression;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2007-02-24 (European Economics)
- NEP-EFF-2007-02-24 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-URE-2007-02-24 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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